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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This review examines the proposed social contract to improve water management in the Canterbury 
Region of New Zealand. This contract defines expectations of resource access and use, forming a 
boundary of responsibility between entitlement holder and society. The type of expectations may 
range from community wellbeing to freedom of private interests. In effect, this creates a tension 
between other regarding action for resource stewardship and the freedom to self-manage a 
resource entitlement with minimal accountability. The tension is embedded in western liberal legal 
frameworks that simultaneously seek enforcement of stewardship obligations while protecting the 
freedom of private interests in resources. In Canterbury a collaborative resource management 
strategy for water, supporting a legal social contract shows the tension in practice. 
 
Recent reforms for improved water management will be discussed to show how the tension 
between stewardship and private interests is likely to affect the social contract as a boundary of 
responsibility. The analysis is based on a view that the law should be considered along with popular 
perceptions, social norms and political pressures as necessary to understanding conflict about access 
and use obligations.1 In resolving such conflict, examples show that the legal framework is likely to 
favour the protection of private interests.2 
 
The main stated resource management purpose of the Environment Canterbury (Temporary 
Commissioners and Improved Water Management) Act 2010 (NZ), known as the ECan Act, is to 
address serious concerns about the allocation, use and management of water in the Canterbury 
Region.3 This legislation has emerged amid increasing demands upon the region’s water resources 
and a national interest in reforming water management.4 Its principle tool for achieving 
improvement is to adopt the Canterbury Water Management Strategy and its preference for 
obligations defined by a social contract. However, it is unclear to what extent this will reinforce the 
freedoms of private interest or emphasise the other regarding actions of stewardship. 
 
The review is based on the following propositions:  
(1)  The legal and institutional framework for water management favours the protection of private 
interests with minimal accountability;  
(2)  This competes with the other regarding expectations of sustainability and stewardship 
contained in environmental protection law and policy;   
                                                          
1  Ann Brower et al, 'The Cowboy, the Southern Man and the Man from Snowy River: The Symbolic Politics of Property in 
Australia, the United States and New Zealand.' (2009) 21 The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 3. 
2  Shepheard, Mark L, 'Some legal and social expectations of a farmer's duty of care' (02/10, CRC for Irrigation Futures, 
2010) <www.irrigationfutures.org.au/imagesDB/news/IM0210-web.pdf> at 4 December 2010; Shepheard, Mark L and 
Paul Martin, 'The political discourse of land stewardship, reframed as a statutory duty' in Kim Rubenstein and Brad 
Jessup (eds), Environmental Discourses in International and Public Law (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming 
2011). 
3  Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) Act 2010, s 3(b) 
4 NZ Cabinet Paper "New Start for Fresh Water" (8 June 2009) CABMin (09) 20/12 Para 14 and 15 
<www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/water/freshwater/new-start-for-fresh-water-paper.pdf> at 12 January 2011; Land and 
Water Forum, 'A Fresh Start for Fresh Water' (Report of the Land and Water Forum, 2010); Raewyn Peart, Kate 
Mulcahy and Natasha Garvan, Managing Freshwater-An EDS Guide (Environmental Defence Society Incorporated, 
2010); Nick Smith, 'A Blue green Vision for New Zealand: Discussion paper by the National Party Environment 
Spokesman.' (The Office of the Leader of the Opposition, NZ House of Representatives, 2006) 
<http://www.national.org.nz/bluegreens/a%20bluegreen%20vision%20for%20new%20zealand.pdf> at 28 November 
2010, p 12; Turnbull Group, 'Governance of water' (Water NZ, 2009) 
<http://www.waternz.org.nz/documents/comment_and_submissions/090730_governance_of_water.pdf> at 19 
November 2010. 
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(3)  Virtue ethics provides an alternative approach for specifying statutory water management 
principles and minimise the risk of policy failure from the unintended consequences of 
competing interpretations of water management. Addressing this requires analysis of the 
following questions: 
(i.) What is the legal framework for water use and management in Canterbury? 
(ii.) What are the multiple meanings concealed by a social contract for water use and 
management? 
(iii.) What version of improved is the ECan Act likely to deliver? 
 
The first section below will describe the key terms and concepts for this discussion. That will be 
followed by an overview of the legal framework for water management in Canterbury. The social 
contract is then analysed for its effectiveness. This analysis will be used to draw some conclusions 
about the version of improved water management that is likely to be favoured by the ECan Act. 
1.1 Key terms and concepts for freshwater access and use 
My interpretation of the legal framework and tension about resource access and use relies on 
several key concepts associated with water management. Resource access and use will be defined as 
a relationship between the giver and receiver of a right/entitlement that specifies the conditions for 
ongoing access. The relationship under examination here is between irrigators and ‘society’ about 
the terms of access to water in a social contract.  
1.2 A property entitlement 
Property is about the rules governing access to and control of resources.5 In practice consent to 
access and use water is a form of property,6 introducing the language of rights and reinforcing their 
importance within the water management debate. This is a relationship between the giver and 
receiver of a water right, about the obligations of access and use.7 The relationship may be formally 
specified by rules governing access and use. These rules include limits upon a property owner’s 
freedom to exploit. The process of defining these bounds represents a framework through which 
ecologically and socially feasible behavioural norms are developed.8 
 
Such obligations are a contested boundary of responsibility between private benefit and public 
good. The boundary may be defined to encompass norms of behaviour and notions of property 
(both formalised in law), and notions of legitimacy and trust in the social contract. These all 
contribute to defining what a right to access and use water entails and represent dimensions of 
responsibility that help to interpret the conflict surrounding water access, use and management.9 
 
                                                          
5 Mark Stallworthy, Sustainability, land use and environment. A legal analysis (Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2002) p 
77-78; Anthony Scott, 'Concepts in resource property rights' in Anthony Scott (ed), The evolution of resource 
property rights (Oxford University Press, 2008) p 49; Barry Barton, 'Property Rights Created under Statute in Common 
Law Legal Systems' in Aileen McHarg (ed), Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) p 98. 
6  Ali Memon and Peter Skelton, 'Institutional Arrangements and Planning Practices to Allocate Freshwater Resources in 
New Zealand: A Way Forward' (2007) 11(1) New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 241; Leigh Raymond, Private 
rights in public resources: equity and property allocation in market-based environmental policy (RFF Press, 2003). 
7  Anthony Scott and Georgina Coustalin, 'Rights over Flowing Water' in Anthony Scott (ed), The Evolution of Resource 
Property Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008); Stallworthy, above n 5. 
8  Maarten A Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process (Oxford 
University Press, 1995) p 294. 
9  Mark L Shepheard and Paul Martin, 'Social Licence to Irrigate: The Boundary Problem' (2008) 27(3) Social Alternatives 
32. 
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Benefiting from property requires that the community as a whole supports, and defends, an owner’s 
‘right’ to exploitation. For communities to invest in support and defence, they must feel comfortable 
that property owners will provide something beneficial to the community in return. That is, there 
must be a form of consensus about responsibility from and to the community.10 Thus, the 
relationship between the giver and receiver of the right, and how it influences expectations of 
performance is very important.11 
 
Where the community is dissatisfied, it can either take away the ‘right’ or impose constraints 
through statutes, or it can apply force or sanctions to ensure that the collective interest is not 
ignored.12 It is normal for property rights to be subject to constraint. Land zoning, natural resource 
management legislation, and industry or supply chain codes of practice are all partly expressions of 
the social consensus about responsibility. It is also a reality that the ‘boundary’ between public and 
private interests is often implicit and it is not fixed across time. 
 
Inclusions of ‘sustainability’ into statutes dealing with water, suggest a re-defining of the boundaries 
of responsibility. For example: 
 
“…to address issues relevant to the efficient, effective, and sustainable management 
of fresh water”13 
 
“To enable present and future generations to gain the greatest social, economic, 
recreational and cultural benefits from our water resources within an 
environmentally sustainable framework”14 
 
 “…to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources. In this 
Act, sustainable management means managing the use, development, and protection 
of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and 
communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing...”15 
 
“…to provide for the sustainable and integrated management of the water sources of 
the State for the benefit of both present and future generations and, in particular: 
(a)  to apply the principles of ecologically sustainable development, and (b)  to 
protect, enhance and restore water sources, their associated ecosystems, ecological 
processes and biological diversity and their water quality, and (c)  to recognise and 
foster the significant social and economic benefits to the State that result from the 
sustainable and efficient use of water…”16 
 
“…to promote the use and management of the Basin water resources in a way that 
optimises economic, social and environmental outcomes; and …(i) to ensure the 
return to environmentally sustainable levels of extraction for water resources that 
                                                          
10  Paul Martin and Miriam Verbeek, 'Property Rights and Property Responsibility' in Property: Rights and 
Responsibilities (Land and Water Australia, 2002). 
11  Barton, above n 5, p 99. 
12  Stallworthy, above n 5, p 79; Sean Coyle and Karen Morrow, Philosophical foundations of environmental law, 
property, rights and nature (HART Publishing, 2004); Murray Raff, 'Toward an Ecologically Sustainable Property 
Concept' in Elizabeth Cooke (ed), Modern Studies in Property Law (2005). 
13  Environment Canterbury Act 2010, s 3. 
14  Ibid, Sch 1. 
15  Resource Management Act 1991, s 5. 
16  Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 3. 
 4 
are over allocated or overused; and (ii) to protect, restore and provide for the 
ecological values and ecosystem services of the Murray-Darling Basin…”17 
 
These statutory statements seek to import concepts of ethical responsibility or ‘virtue’ into 
responsibilities of water access and use.18 They implicitly define permit holders as stewards of 
natural resources, providing little certainty about what this means in practice. 
1.3 A boundary of responsibility 
There is uncertainty between water entitlement holders and society about where the boundary lies 
between private benefit and community wellbeing. It is one function of law to clearly define the 
boundary as obligations of access and use. However the tendency of law to uphold freedom of rights 
means that legal responsibility reflects a minimum level of accountability.19 Yet political aspirations 
and social expectations about sustainable use and stewardship of water (such as those embodied in 
the statutory statements at 1.1 above) suggest a boundary that defines a concern with stewardship 
of water systems. Such elements reflect the importance of social responsibility (in the social 
contract) when defining water access and use obligations. 
 
Social responsibility debates are important to irrigation farming.20 Reforms relying on market-based 
approaches to water allocation and use are changing how the water resources are shared, making 
the tradeoffs between the environment, and urban areas and farming more apparent.21 Society is 
increasingly expecting water entitlement holders to justify their access to and use of water, 
suggesting that in the longer term the exercise of private property interests is materially constrained 
by accountability to the community.22 For example, approval to access and use water for irrigation 
involves a (potentially tradable) permit, under the RMA, to extract some percentage of the available 
water. Such entitlements are increasingly subject to scrutiny and adjustment through political, legal 
and administrative processes. These include development of new water sharing arrangements and 
decisions about allocations, the development of laws to determine the priority of water access, and 
public investment in water infrastructure. These processes determine the conditions for trading, use 
and the availability of water, generating changes in access to water with limited regard to the 
apparent security (or property right) that a tradable entitlement to water suggests. 
 
There is a general expectation that farmers will act responsibly and meet social expectations through 
environmental stewardship.23 This typically entails not causing avoidable harm and honouring legal 
obligations.24 Performance is judged by acting consistently with specified legal obligations and 
unspecified behavioural norms.25 Farmers may be held accountable (formally or informally) should 
                                                          
17  Water Act 2007 (Cth of Aust), s 3. 
18  A particular example of this trend occurs more broadly with a statutory duty of care for environmental protection, as 
documented in Mark L Shepheard and Paul Martin, 'Multiple meanings and practical problems: The duty of care and 
stewardship in agriculture' (2009) 6 Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law 191. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Neil Gunningham, 'Cotton, Health and Environment: A case study of self-regulation' (2004) 9(2) The Australasian 
Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 189. 
21  Alex Gardner, Richard Bartlett and Janice Gray, Water Resources Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009). 
22  Neil Gunningham, Robert A Kagan and Dorothy Thornton, 'Social Licence and Environmental Protection' (Centre for 
Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2002) p 7. 
23  N Bowie, 'New directions in corporate social responsibility (moral pluralism and reciprocity)' (1991) 34(4) Business 
Horizons 56; L Moir, 'What do we mean by corporate social responsibility?' (2001) 1(2) Corporate Governance 16; 
Alison Warhurst, 'Future roles of business in society: The expanding boundaries of corporate responsibility and a 
compelling case for partnership' (2005) 37 Futures 151. 
24  Bowie, ibid. 
25  E.M. Epstein, 'The corporate social policy process: Beyond business ethics, corporate social responsibility and, 
corporate social responsiveness' (1987) XXIX(3) California Management Review 99. 
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they transgress their boundaries of responsibility.26 The boundary is partly fluid reflecting minimum 
accountability (against defined legal obligations) or more ambiguous expectations of virtue.27 
Conceptions of stewardship in law and policy attempt to define a boundary of responsibility in terms 
of virtue using terms like ‘good practice’. What is not clear is the extent that a new boundary of 
responsibility expands minimal accountability. 
 
A number of factors determine expectations of what is ecologically and socially feasible (Table 1).28 
They help shape a social discourse wherein boundaries of responsibility are constantly being 
renegotiated.  
Table 1 
Factors defining a boundary of responsibility 
 
Factors Description 
Norms of 
Behaviour 
 
Social ‘norms’ influence the expectations of industry behaviour.29 Morals, ethics 
and values help define norms.30 Morals refer to personal standards of behaviour 
and distinguishing between right and wrong. Ethics is broader including formal 
and informal rules of conduct, while values are beliefs about what is valuable or 
important.31 Converting expectations to practice requires some correlation 
between the social norms, business culture and operating rules.32 This is more 
likely when there is a mechanism to hold decision-makers accountable for their 
performance against the norms.33 
Exploitative 
Freedom of 
Property 
The social and legal expectation is that a property right carries a substantially un-
attenuated freedom to exploit for private gain, subject to strictly delimited rights 
of the Crown applied through regulation and the obligation to avoid harm to 
other legal interests.34 
Legitimacy Legitimacy arises from accepted roles or from a dialogue with stakeholders 
reflecting genuine intent.35 It helps to ensure a focus on what is expected under 
the social contract rather than trying to address an open-ended range of socio-
economic and environmental concerns. 
Trust 
 
Social trust is a key consideration in the maintenance of social contract.36 During 
resource access conflicts partisan arguments are weighed in the light of what is 
known about the social performance of the sector. Perceived failures of 
responsibility undermine credibility relative to other interest groups.  
                                                          
26  To bear responsibility requires acknowledgement of the potential to be called to account. This may be to a formal 
institution like a tribunal, commission or court; or an informal (but no less concrete) group like parents, children or a 
circle of friends; or to a metaphysical forum such as God or human kind. Mark Bovins, The Quest for Responsibility: 
Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organisations (Cambridge University Press, 1998) p 28. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Shepheard, above n 2. 
29  Bridget M Hutter, 'The role of non-state actors in regulation' (Report No. 37, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 2006). 
30  Bowie, above n 23; A B Carroll, 'The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral management of 
organisational stakeholders' (1991) 34(4) Business Horizons 39; Epstein, above n 25; Moir, above n 23. 
31  Judy Pearsall and Bill Trumble (eds), Oxford English Reference Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2nd revised ed, 
2001). 
32  Shepheard and Martin, above n 9. 
33  Bovins, above n 26. 
34  For an overview see Raff, above n 12. 
35  M Muller and B Siebenhuner, 'Policy instruments for sustainability oriented organisational learning' (2007) 16 
Business Strategy and the Environment 232. 
36  John F Dovido, The Social Psychology of Prosocial Behaviour (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006); Michael Siegrist, 
Carmen Keller and Henk A L Kiers, 'A New Look at the Psychometric Paradigm of Perception of Hazards' (2005) 25(1) 
Risk Analysis 211; Matthias Weber and Jens Hemmelskamp, Towards Environmental Innovation Systems (Lavoisier, 
2005). 
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This range of factors alludes to the difficulty of formally specifying expectations for good 
stewardship of natural resources in law. Particularly when the bias of the legal system is to uphold 
norms of exploitive freedom within a defined level of minimum accountability. Such standards are 
unlikely to satisfy legitimacy and social trust concerns about stewardship of natural resources. These 
factors generate competing expectations of behaviour, which suggests that clear boundaries 
between freedom to exploit for private gain, and constraints on exploitation in the public interest, 
will not be set by law alone. 
 
Boundaries of responsibility ought to reflect genuine dialogue with stakeholders over the relevant 
social and environmental issues associated with a social contract, and investment of resources to 
meet expectations. Critical evaluation of water management performance occurs through social 
networks such as local communities, environmental stakeholders, or networks of competing water 
users. Preparedness to act on responsibilities is likely to arise through awareness of community 
wellbeing and dialogue within such networks. These are likely to be the ‘place’ where criticism 
acquires political power, and are relevant for the social contract as they can foster shared norms and 
support cooperation that leads to changes in wellbeing.37 
 
Wellbeing is described as an overall satisfaction with life38. This has been proposed as a basis for 
developing expectations of performance associated with natural resource management generally,39 
and for improved water management in NZ.40 This approach suggests that boundaries of 
responsibility for water management may be best refined through a process where water users 
develop networks with relevant communities, through which they explore their specific contribution 
to wellbeing. Attention to the welfare concerns of relevant networks makes it more likely that 
specific issues, circumstances and power relations will be reflected in a tacit agreement about social 
responsibilities. This would lead to reporting against specific contributions to the welfare of specific 
networks, rather than ill-defined generalities about impact on the environment. Adequate definition 
of the social contract as a boundary of responsibility (amid a policy framework of changing 
responsibility expectations) can help clarify the obligations of access and use.  
1.4 Stewardship versus minimum accountability 
Sustainability suggests obligations reflecting needs, limits, equity and systems management.41 These 
are intended to avoid harm and promote a neighbourly ethos, a state of wellbeing. Such 
expectations can be translated into concepts of ‘stewardship’ – the guardian of place, holding a 
position of responsibility42 – that has become important in modern conceptions of natural resource 
access, use and management.43 In relation to natural resources, the core duties of stewards are 
conservation to keep resources for posterity and protection to save resources from harm.44 This is 
                                                          
37  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 'The wellbeing of nations, the role of human and 
social capital, education and skills' (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, 2001). 
38  Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Measuring social capital, an Australian framework and indicators' (ABS Information 
Paper No 1378.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004). 
39  Stewart Lockie et al, 'Capacity for change, testing a model for the inclusion of social indicators in Australia's national 
land and water resources audit' (2002) 45(6) Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 813. 
40  Canterbury Mayoral Forum, 'Canterbury Water Management Strategy - Strategic Framework with Updated Targets, 
Provisional July 2010' (Canterbury Water, 2009); Land and Water Forum, above n 4. 
41  Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2003) 
42  Pearsall and Trumble, above n 31. 
43  Richard Barnes, Property Rights and Natural Resources, Studies in International Law (HART Publishing, 2009); Anna 
Carr, Grass Roots and Green Tape. Principles and Practices of Environmental Stewardship. (The Federation Press, 
2002); Don Curry, 'Farming & Food. A Sustainable Future.' (The Policy Commission on Farming and Food, 2002) 
<www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/farming> 
44  Barnes, Ibid. 
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recognised relative to water in NZ.45 Stewardship provides a conception of prudent or right 
behaviour to limit or reverse environmental harm.46 Prudence is about ends: how to make important 
choices using a mixture of foresight, morals and self understanding; in effect a demonstration of 
virtue.47 This is a contrast to the expectations of minimum accountability traditionally associated 
with property rights. 
 
The minimum accountability48 associated with private interests is that farmers’ responsibilities area 
mixture of compliance with specific laws and obligations to neighbours not to infringe their 
exploitative property right.49 Property is considered a largely un-attenuated right to exploit50, with 
constraints imposed only where Parliament has clearly specified in statute or where exploitation 
may unjustifiably interfere with the interests of another property owner (or the physical well being 
of other people). This emphasises minimum accountability for environmental protection with 
farmers’ freedom to exploit their property rights paramount.51 Within this traditional paradigm, 
freedom is supported by a level of accountability that is less onerous than the responsibilities that 
may be implicit in virtue-based expectations of the responsibility.52 Figure 1 illustrates this 
distinction between minimum accountability and virtue. 
 
Figure 1 
Tension between competing expectations for natural resource management 
 
                                                          
45  Turnbull Group, above n 4, see Appendix B. This reflects the duty under s 17 Resource Management Act 1991. 
46  Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-Making, Modern Studies in European Law (HART 
Publishing, 2005) ; Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 'Change in the High Country: Environmental 
Stewardship and Tenure Review' (Parliament of New Zealand, 2009) 
<http://www.pce.parliament.nz/assets/Uploads/Reports/pdf/Change_in_the_high_country.pdf> at 28 November 
2010, p 77. 
47  Bernard E Jacob, 'Ancient Rhetoric, Modern Legal Thought, and Politics: A Review Essay on the Translation of 
Viehweg's "Topics and Law"' (1995) 89 Northwestern University Law Review 1622.  
48  Bovins, above n 26. 
49  Shepheard and Martin, above n 18. 
50  Lee Godden, 'Governing common resources: Environmental markets and property in water' in Aileen McHarg (ed), 
Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford University Press, 2010) p 414. 
51  Shepheard, Mark. 'Some legal and social expectations of a farmer's duty of care' (02/10, CRC for Irrigation Futures, 
2010) <www.irrigationfutures.org.au/imagesDB/news/IM0210-web.pdf> at 4 December 2010. 
52  Tucker LJ in Latimer v AEC Ltd [1953] AC 643. 
Tension of 
meaning 
concealed 
by statutory 
trends in 
NRM 
Freedom of private 
interests to exploit 
entitlements with 
minimum 
accountability 
 
For example, a fully 
specified legal 
boundary of reasonable 
care and private benefit 
Other regarding 
action, constraining 
exploitation for 
community wellbeing. 
 
For example, a social 
contract for water 
stewardship? 
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The practical implication of a failure to resolve the tension in Figure 1is a range of competing 
meanings about the legally enforceable boundaries for natural resource management.53 Achieving 
the desire for increased care requires refinement of words with multiple meanings and connotations 
to create clear accountabilities within the context of private access and use rights. Examples include 
‘sustainability’, ‘precaution’, ‘stewardship’ and ‘wellbeing’ and ‘social contract’. All are terms that 
may be readily identified within debate about water access and use. These words have different 
meanings in different contexts, and general pronouncements of statutory intent do not provide all 
the guidance needed for defining them,54 leading to confusion and misunderstanding about what 
constitutes a breach, or conformity with rules. 
1.5 The social contract 
The concept of a social contract as resource consent is to provide a focus for specifying the boundary 
of responsibility between the private freedoms of minimal accountability and the other regarding 
action of stewardship. It is used as an attempt to provide a bridge between private interests and 
community wellbeing overcoming the tension illustrated in Figure 1 above. 
 
A social contract is about satisfying interacting legal and social expectations as a guide to human 
behaviour in natural resource management.55 The concept highlights that ownership of a legal right 
to resources does not guarantee community support for the exercise of that right. Rather the 
maintenance of a social contract depends on elements of law, beliefs, relationships, administration 
and expectations.56 Many of these are inherently political. 
 
The actual exploitative interest of the entitlement holder can be a result of both well-defined 
property rights and poorly defined social expectations acted out in the form of restriction or 
expansion of the social contract to use that resource. What constitutes a social contract can be 
difficult to specify57 because social expectations cover a diversity of concerns about economic, 
political, ecological, social and cultural consequences.58 The underlying issues are often expressed 
vaguely and, for natural resources, are couched as arguments about environmental stewardship and 
ecologically sustainable development.59 They do not provide precise practical guidance, are not 
constrained by legal rights or obligations and do not necessarily respect private ownership.60 
                                                          
53  Chris Cocklin, Naomi Mautner and Jacqui Dibden, 'Public policy, private landholders: Perspectives on policy 
mechanisms for sustainable land management' (2007) 85 Journal of Environmental Management 12; Jim 
Crosthwaite, Farmer Land Stewardship: A pillar to reinforce natural resource management? (2001)  
<www.agrifood.info/connections/summer_2001/Crosthwaite.html> at 25 May 2007; Shepheard and Martin, above n 
18. 
54  Barton, above n 5, see p 99. 
55  Gunningham et al. above n 22, see p 13; Gary Lynch-Wood and David Williamson, 'The Social Licence as a Form of 
Regulation for Small and Medium Enterprises' (2007) 34(3) Journal of Law and Society 321; Turnbull Group, above n 
4, see p 12. 
56  K Lyons and K Davies, 'The Need to Consider the Administration of Property Rights and Restrictions Before Creating 
Them' in Alex Smajgl and Silva Larson (eds), Sustainable Resource Use: Institutional Dynamics and Economics (2007); 
Murray Raff, Private property and environmental responsibility: A comparative study of German real property law 
(Kluwer Law International, 2003); Hon. S Robertson, 'Property rights, responsibility and reason' (Speech delivered by 
the Queensland Minister for Natural Resources and Mines, 8 April 2003); WWF Australia, 'Native Vegetation 
Regulation: Financial impact and policy issues.' (2005); Phillip Hone and Iain Fraser, 'Resource Management and Duty 
of Care' (2004) 11(3) Agenda 195.  Alex Gardner, 'The Duty of Care for Sustainable Land Management' (1998) 5(1) 
The Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 29.  
57  Hutter, above n 29. 
58  Epstein, above n 25. 
59  Warhurst, above n 23; Jenifer McKay, 'Issues for CEO's of water utilities with implementation of Australia's water 
laws.' (2006) 135 Journal of Contemporary Water Research and Education 115. 
60  Lynch-Wood and Williamson, above n 55. 
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A legal framework for use and management of water puts access and use arrangements into effect. 
This requires clearly defined responsibilities that meet policy outcomes. Contracts are an 
increasingly utilised to provide clarity about responsibilities in market based resource 
management.61This brings an expectation that self-interest rather than moral or other forms of 
accountability will be effective and efficient in achieving public good outcomes.62 There are 
implications for defining the resource access and use rights as a social contract; it hinges success on 
the people and politics on a particular situation.63 This makes the social contract a focus for 
examining the tensions in legal arrangements that seek stewardship for community wellbeing within 
a market based policy setting that favours private benefit.64 
1.6 The social contract as a boundary of responsibility for water 
stewardship 
A social contract to define water stewardship appears to suggest limits to the exploitive freedoms 
implicit in property rights by introducing other regarding action as an obligation.65 This should help 
to form norms of conservation practice, and protect legitimacy and social trust in return for 
environmentally benign farming practice.66These are virtuous conceptions of performance that 
provide a means to review the effectiveness of the social contract for water stewardship. 
 
The term ‘virtue’ refers broadly to action directed at the realisation of goals beyond self-interest i.e. 
‘other regarding action’.  I contend that this provides an alternative framework for defining rights 
and responsibility rather than market-driven notions of efficiency that emphasise self-interest. The 
practical significance is that it will remain difficult if not impossible to instantiate effective 
stewardship of water (and natural resources generally) if the legal framework governing access and 
use remains too focussed on individual rights and interests. 
 
Conceptualising access and use (property) rights in the context of countervailing values is an approach 
that runs counter to the legal detachment of property rights are from environmental values to 
facilitate resource transfer. For example, the preference for market-based regulation of water 
resources has reinforced the separation of property rights in land from those in water, developing 
separate commodities or interests despite the physical and ecological connections between them.67 
The purpose of introducing countervailing values is to develop and enhance a model of property that 
is based on both responsibility and right, rather than right alone. This model incorporates virtue as a 
necessary part of a just and efficient legal order,68 into water law so that the action of resource 
managers may be directed by motivations other than self-interest. 
                                                          
61  Paul Martin et al, Developing a Good Regulatory Practice Model for Environmental Regulations Impacting on Farmers' 
(Research Report, Australian Farm Institute, 2007), p 43. 
62  Mike Young et al, 'Duty of care: An instrument for increasing the effectiveness of catchment management.' 
(Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2003), p 8. 
63  Adrienne Lomax, Ali Memon and Brett Painter, 'The Canterbury Water Management Strategy as a Collaborative 
Planning Initiative: a preliminary assessment' (Lincoln Ventures Ltd, 2010). See p 28. 
64  Neil Gunningham, 'Innovative Governance and Regulatory Design: Managing Water Resources.' (Landcare Research, 
2008); Sandra Postel, Pillar of sand: Can the irrigation miracle last? (W.W. Norton & Co., 1999); Shepheard and Martin, 
above n 9. 
65  Canterbury Mayoral Forum, above n 40, p 15. 
66  Mark L Shepheard and Paul Martin, 'Using the moot court to trial legislation about land stewardship.' (2011) 28(2) Land 
Use Policy 371. 
67  Douglas E Fisher, 'Rights of property in water: confusion or clarity' (2004) 21 Environment and Planning Law Journal 
200 ; Godden, above n 50. 
68  Peter Koller, 'Law, Morality, and Virtue' in Rebecca L Walker and Philip J Ivanhoe (eds), Working Virtue. Virtue Ethics 
and Contemporary Moral Problems (Clarendon Press, 2007). 
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Virtue ethics can increase the other regarding element of law by providing a focus for establishing 
water stewardship as part of moral character, a habit of action and character trait.69 This can be 
achieved when specific virtues such as fair and judicious usage, honesty and a concern for the water 
systems in question are identified as the ideals of stewardship.70 
 
I suggest that the legal bias to protecting rights of access and use with minimal accountability risks 
stifling the potential of a social contract to deliver stewardship outcomes. Thus without reform to 
provide a legal basis for virtuous performance, the social contract is only likely to define norms of 
behaviour and exploitative freedom as minimum accountability. This is unlikely to meet the 
legitimacy and social trust concerns that advocates of a social contract anticipate. 
                                                          
69  Rosalind Hursthouse, 'Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Morality?' in James Dreier (ed), Contemporary Debates 
in Moral Theory (Wiley-Blackwell, 2005). 
70  Adrian Walsh and Mark Shepheard, ‘The Role of Virtue in Natural Resource Management’ in Jacqueline Williams and 
Paul Martin (eds), A Social Licence and the Regulation of Natural Resources (CSIRO Publishing, Forthcoming 2011). 
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Chapter 2 
Water management in Canterbury 
Recent debates about water in Canterbury, NZ are largely conflicts about access and use between 
competing uses and unresolved debate about long-term water resource allocation and 
management. In response to these challenges, a language of stewardship has emerged within the 
legal and policy framework for water. This is evident in terms such as; ‘well-being,’71 ‘social 
contract,’72 ‘balance,’73 ‘sustainability,’74and ‘good practice’.75 These have multiple interpretations 
that can be problematic for defining clear water management obligations. 
 
Water reform in New Zealand is founded on achieving efficient water use.76 This has technical, 
economic and dynamic elements, to achieve beneficial uses with optimal outcomes for the 
environment and community.77 The particular circumstances of Canterbury have generated systemic 
shortcomings for water allocation management and provided the impetus to find a better way.78 The 
Canterbury Mayoral Forum proposes statutory social contracts as a tool for implementation of 
reform.79 
 
Improving on the current adversarial processes is anticipated to provide an alternative approach to 
water management that is representative, operable, trusted and accepted by the Canterbury 
community.80 This is effectively a conception of other regarding action or virtue, reliant on 
community consensus to resolve conflict early in the planning process before it gets to court.81 There 
is also a strong emphasis in the water strategy that legal processes should not undermine the 
consensus expressed in agreed and statutory social contracts.82I foresee four problems with this 
approach: defining clear obligations in a social contract;83 excluding courts from enforcement;84 the 
extent that multiple meaning in community consensus around a social contract is likely to generate 
further dispute,85 and tension of private interest fostered by a market based approach to water 
allocation and use versus the other regarding expectations of stewardship.86 
 
Specified obligations, or ‘boundaries of responsibility’ are a necessary part to develop practical 
meaning for wellbeing and stewardship of water. The CWMS promotes the social contract as an 
effective way to define those obligations.87 
                                                          
71  Land and Water Forum, above n 4, for example p 7 (with several other references to wellbeing throughout the 
 document). 
72  Canterbury Mayoral Forum, above n 40, p 15. 
73  Ibid, p 8. 
74 Canterbury Mayoral Forum, ibid, p 20; Land and Water Forum, above n 4, p 11; Environment Canterbury Act 2010, 
 above n 3, s 3(b) and Sch 1. 
75  Land and Water Forum, above n 4, p 28. 
76  Land and Water Forum, above n 4, see pp IX - XIII. 
77  Ibid, see ‘efficiency,’ p 63. 
78  Ibid, Management of water has been marked by conflict, litigation, cost and uncertainty under a first in first served 
 approach to allocation with an absence of limits, p 13. 
79  Canterbury Mayoral Forum, above n 40, p 41. 
80 Environment Canterbury Regional Council, 'Draft Canterbury Regional Policy Statement' (Report No R10/65, 
 Environment Canterbury, 2010), p 52. 
81  Land and Water Forum, above n 4, p V. 
82  Canterbury Mayoral Forum, above n 40, see p 15. 
83  Shepheard and Martin, above n 9. 
84  Shepheard and Martin, above n 18. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Shepheard and Martin, above n 66. 
87  Canterbury Mayoral Forum, above n 40, p 7 and 15. 
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2.1 Sustainability and Water Management 
The Resource Management Act 1991, abbreviated to RMA, provides the statutory framework for 
sustainable freshwater management in New Zealand. It separates responsibilities between three 
levels of government and water users. The Minister for the Environment and Minister for 
Conservation hold responsibility for national policy statements, creating environmental standards 
and assessing water conservation orders. Regional Councils such as Environment Canterbury, called 
ECan, hold principal responsibility for regional water planning and consents to use water. Territorial 
Councils hold responsibility for implementation of management plans in their areas, make decisions 
about land-use planning and hold responsibility for economic development. Finally those holding 
consents to use water hold responsibility to operate subject to the terms of their consent. 
 
The purpose of the RMA is to provide for sustainable management of resources.88 The vagaries of 
such statutory terms have given rise to disputes about its interpretation.89 Interpreting sustainable 
management is complex,90 and in the absence of clear policy guidance from central government has 
relied on court interpretation of statutory rights of access and use.91 This has emphasised the 
tension between stewardship and minimum accountability of an entitlement at the core of conflict 
about water management. For example, The High Court has identified that an access entitlement to 
water is akin to a right that brings with it legitimate expectations for exclusive use,92 but also that a 
narrow preoccupation with property rights is out of keeping with popular and holistic notions of 
sustainability in the RMA.93 This contrast emphasises the contested nature of sustainable 
management within an institutional framework that upholds freedom of property rights.94 
 
Sustainable management, as applied by the courts under the RMA, allows decision makers to 
balance development within its environmental context.95 Known as a ‘broad overall judgement’ 
approach,96 it provides that weight be given to the (social, cultural, economic and environmental) 
elements of sustainable management in the context of particular circumstances.97 This requires 
decision-makers to consider how management of natural and physical resources will enable “people 
and communities to provide for their social, economic and cultural well-being, health and safety” 
and how the statutory goals of intergenerational equity, safeguarding ecosystem services and a 
precautionary approach regarding potential environmental effects can be met.98 
 
The broad statutory “language, meanings and connotations” are intended,99 to account for the 
diversity of values about the environment as a basis for resource allocation and management 
                                                          
88  Resource Management Act 1991, s 5(2). 
89  Peter Skelton and Ali Memon, 'Adopting Sustainability as an Overarching Environmental Policy: a Review of section 5 
of the RMA' (2002) X(1) Resource Management Journal, p 8. 
90 Neil Deans, 'Freshwater values: duties and responsibilities under the RMA' in Rob Harris (ed), Handbook of 
Environmental Law (Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of NZ Inc, p 208.  
91  For an analysis of the cases see Barry Barton, 'The nature of resource consents: Statutory permits or property rights' 
in Derek Nolon (ed), Environmental Law: National issues (New Zealand Law Society, 2009), pp 51-60 and 71-77.  
92  Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Limited [2005] 2 NZLR 268 
93  Barker J inFalkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622 
94  Skelton and Memon, above n 89, see page 2. 
95  Ibid. 
96  The ‘broad overall judgement’ cases are reviewed by Skelton and Memon, above n 89, including; NZ Rail v 
Marlborough District Council [1994] NZRMA 70, Trio Holdings Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] NZRMA 97, 
North Shore City Council and others v Auckland Regional Council (Okura) [1997] NZRMA 59, and  Falkner v Gisborne 
District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622. 
97  Skelton and Memon, above n 89; Also where the elements of sustianable management are described in the Resource 
Management Act 1991, ss 5(2)(a) to (c). 
98  Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ), see s 5 
99  NZ Rail, above n 96. 
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decisions.100 Such statutory principles provide a guide to important values.101 These are adopted and 
expanded upon within the ECan Act as fundamental principles for the Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy,102 supporting the notion of sustainable management as an ethic, 
representing virtuous behaviour, constantly adjusting with social values in the circumstances.103 
2.2 Emergence of the ECan Act 
The Environment Canterbury Act 2010 has emerged amid concerns that the Resource Management 
Act 1991 has not been implemented effectively for sustainable management of water.104 Constraints 
identified include:105 inadequate water allocation via plans and consents that focus only on 
environmental impacts; lack of statutory reference to the precautionary principle; an underlying 
statutory philosophy that rural land use should not be constrained; and a narrow interpretation of 
cumulative environmental effects by the courts. Such challenges suggest an interpretation based on 
minimal accountability rather than the virtuous approach developed and applied by the courts. Such 
challenges have led to the call for a new collaborative governance water management paradigm for 
Canterbury.106 
 
A lack of policy and standards about water at national level has meant regional councils have 
struggled with determining and implementing policy for water allocation and management.107 This 
situation has contributed to tension in Canterbury, evident in public debate between interests 
favouring water management for environmental protection and those favouring water management 
for economic development.108 
 
Farmers’ commitment to their economic wellbeing generally means that their environmental 
responsibilities; obligations to future generations; and the extent that the ethos of sustainability 
trumps economic development are contested issues.109 Such conflicting positions have generated a 
water management planning impasse at the regional level, with draft plan objectives criticised as too 
broad and not sufficiently quantified, leaving many unconvinced of the need for regulation and 
others concerned about not enough protection.110 
 
With increasing concern about the state of water management in Canterbury, the NZ government, 
during 2009, launched an inquiry into the adequacy of Environment Canterbury’s water 
management planning.111 This identified that water management planning in Canterbury as 
                                                          
100 Skelton and Memon, above n 89, p 9. 
101  Royden Somerville, 'Phantom environmental risks and environmental decision-making' (New Zealand Law Society, 
2003), p 58. For guiding principles see Resource Management Act 1991, ss (6) to (8). 
102  Environment Canterbury Act 2010, Sch 1 Vision and Principles for the Canterbury Water Management Strategy. 
103  Somerville, above n 101, p 70 “relevant material…recording the national community of interest’s ethical approach 
to such matters.” 
104  For an account of some concerns about “institutional inertia” in regional councils see Memon and Skelton, above n 
6, p 243. 
105  Gunningham, above n 64, p 44. 
106  Ibid, p 34. 
107  Memon and Skelton, above n 6, p 243. 
108  Water is causing disputes, often with sub optimal outcomes, Land and Water Forum, above n 4, p V.  For example, 
Fish and Game have been active in supporting the water conservation order process in Canterbury, such as for the 
Hurunui River, in order to protect it from further allocation for irrigation. Alternately, irrigation interests such as 
Central Plains Water and supporters have been actively promoting the need for further irrigation storage and 
infrastructure development. 
109  Gunningham, above n 64, p 30. 
110  Ibid. 
111  See 'terms of reference' in Wyatt Creech et al, 'Investigation of the Performance of Environment Canterbury under 
the Resource Management Act & Local Government Act' (Report commissioned by the Minister for the 
Environment and Minister for Local Government into the performance of Environment  Canterbury, 2010) 
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dysfunctional;112 where the statutory planning process under the RMA has suffered prolonged delays 
at the hands of elected ECan councillors.113 The enquiry recommended options for overcoming the 
planning impasse about water management, to which the government responded by passing the 
Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) Act 2010 
(NZ): 
 
“I find it extraordinary that 18 years after the passage of the Resource Management 
Act we still do not have an operative plan in Canterbury to manage its water;”114 and 
 
“The regional council has failed to properly look after water management in our area. 
It has failed to control water quality deterioration, it has certainly failed to have a plan 
for strategic economic development, and it has failed, after nearly 19 years of the 
Resource Management Act, to even come up with a natural resources plan that is 
operative.”115 
2.3 The ECan Act and Canterbury Water Management Strategy  
The ECan Act seeks “to address issues relevant to the efficient, effective, and sustainable 
management of fresh water.”116 This reaffirms sustainable management as a statutory principle 
relative to freshwater resources, and offers the vision and principles of the Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy (CWMS) for its interpretation (Appendix 1).117 
 
The Canterbury Water Management Strategy (CWMS) aims to establish a new paradigm of 
allocation and management for water in the Canterbury Region.118 This is to recognise prospects for 
further water resource development and realise improved water use, involving; water brokerage, 
reconfigured allocation and transfer regimes, and introducing water use charges to “drive efficiency 
of water use”.119  Simultaneously the new approach will address environmental impacts and achieve 
environmental restoration, specify performance criteria and avoid over prescription.120 The tension 
embedded within the new approach reflects the problem of conflict between a market-based 
approach favouring private interests and minimal accountability, versus delivery of water 
stewardship with other regarding action.121 
2.4 CWMS and the social contract 
Central to implementation of the new paradigm is a social contract: described as an agreed balance 
between all parties to deliver wellbeing and safeguard ecosystems.122  Interestingly the strategy also 
highlights that social contracts will need legal status,123 but that the legal processes “should not be 
                                                          
112  Ibid; Gunningham, above n 87.  
113  Creech, above n 111. 
114  New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 March 2010, 9928 (Nick Smith, Minister for the 
Environment). 
115  New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 March 2010, 9941 (Amy Adams, Member for 
Selwyn) 
116  Environment Canterbury Act 2010, s 3(b). 
117  Ibid, Sch 1; Canterbury Mayoral Forum, ‘ECan Act’ implications for the Strategy <www.canterburywater.org.nz> 
accessed 23 October 2010. 
118  Canterbury Mayoral Forum, above n 40, p 7. 
119  Ibid, p 11. 
120  Ibid. 
121  Refer to section 1 above. 
122  Canterbury Mayoral Forum, above n 40, p 15. 
123  Ibid, p 41. 
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allowed to undermine this balanced, holistic approach to managing water.”124 This presents a social 
contract as a legal boundary of responsibility between resource users, regulators and society to 
achieve sustainability.  
 
A key element of this is a social contract that “will adapt and evolve to changing circumstances.”125 
This is potentially a problem for legal use of a social contract since it is a fundamental element of 
regulation that people have a right to know what they are obliged to do in a way that is clearly pre-
stated.126 A contract of shifting social expectations may leave water entitlement holders with 
uncertainty about their obligations. 
2.5 Linking CWMS to the RMA 
The CWMS vision and principles are given statutory status as relevant to the efficient, effective and 
sustainable management of fresh water in the Canterbury region.127 This includes application to 
regional policy statements and plans under the Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ)128, an 
acknowledgement of the CWMS success in providing collaboration over water management.129 
Statutory statements are important for defining statutory rights to access and use public 
resources.130 The commissioners will need to heed this status of the CWMS in developing an 
effective operational water plan “to draw on the wisdom and opinions of the mayors of 
Canterbury”131 as they progress statutory policy and planning under the RMA.132 The CWMS is 
identified as a regional strategy to advance the sustainable management of freshwater,133 and that 
will drive change to the Natural Resources Regional Plan.134 
 
The main statutory plan for sustainable management of water in Canterbury is the Natural 
Resources Regional Plan, made under the RMA. The current plan has been a source of conflict 
regarding water management and the inability of the Canterbury Regional Council to bring a 
functioning water plan to fruition. The current plan brings the 1998 Regional Policy Statement, also 
made under the RMA, into effect. Amendments during 2010 included water management 
chapters.135 Introductory comments in the current plan highlight that it will continue to change, 
reflecting community-driven priorities developed through the CWMS and zone water management 
committees.136 
 
A draft regional policy statement to replace the 1998 policy was released during 2010. It provides an 
overview of the significant resource management issues facing the region and a framework for 
management over 10-15 years. The current regional plan may need to be changed to implement the 
                                                          
124  Ibid, p 15. 
125  Ibid, p 17. 
126  Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan, ‘The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the struggle for Legal 
Control’ (1991) 54(6) The Modern Law Review 848, p 857. 
127  Environment Canterbury Act 2010, s 3(b) and Sch 1. 
128  Ibid, s 63. 
129  Creech et al, above n 111. 
130  Barton, above n 91. 
131  New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 March 2010, 9929 (Nick Smith, Minister for the 
Environment). 
132  Draft Regional Policy Statement, above n 80, p 6. 
133  Ibid, p 46. 
134 Environment Canterbury Regional Council, Natural Resources Regional Plan Update, October 2010 
<http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/Plans/nrrp-newsletter-update-001010.pdf> at 5 October 2010. 
135  Variation 1, notified on 23 October 2010, amended the Canterbury Natural Resources Regional Plan, including 
Chapter 4 Water Quality, Chapter 5 Water Quantity, Chapter 6 Beds and Margins of Lakes and Rivers, and Chapter 7 
Wetlands. See <http://ecan.govt.nz/our-responsibilities/regional-plans/nrrp/Pages/variation-one.aspx> accessed 30 
January 2011. 
136  Environment Canterbury Regional Council, Natural Resources Regional Plan Update, above n 134.  
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new regional policy statement, once it is complete. It is for this reason that I will emphasise the 
approach to water management being described in the draft regional policy statement. 
 
The draft policy statement acknowledges the CWMS as a valuable strategic input,137 critical for 
resolution of freshwater management issues within the regional natural resources planning and 
management framework.138 This places the water strategy sanctioned under the ECan Act, within 
the RMA planning framework, and meets the ECan Act requirements that the water strategy vision 
and principles be regarded by the Regional Council in planning decisions.139 Doing this reinforces 
‘sustainable management’ as the statutory purpose to which the water strategy is directed.140 For 
freshwater, the Canterbury Draft Regional Policy Statement seeks sustainable management, use, 
development and protection to provide for wellbeing (Figure 2).141Sustainable management provides 
an enabling framework, where the environment is the basis for social, cultural and economic 
wellbeing.142 
 
Figure 2 
Proposed objectives for sustainable freshwater management in Canterbury.143 
 
 
Introducing wellbeing places the performance of a water user into a context of social obligation, 
where water management is viewed and evaluated as a contribution to economic, cultural and 
environmental systems within a region. This is a multiple-bottom-line approach to defining 
obligations that aim for other regarding action, consistent with the legislated vision and principles of 
                                                          
137  Draft Regional Policy Statement, above n 80, p 21. 
138  Ibid, p 51. 
139  Canterbury Mayoral Forum, ECan Act Implications for the Strategy (2010) <http://www.canterburywater.org.nz> at 
23 October 2010; Environment Canterbury Act 2010, s3(b). 
140  ECan Draft Regional Policy Statement, above n 80, p 46; 
141  ECan Draft Regional Policy Statement, ibid, p 45. 
142  Ibid p 6; Evan Christen et al, 'Triple Bottom Line Reporting to Promote Sustainability of Irrigation in Australia' (2006) 
20 Irrigation and Drainage Systems 329. 
143  ECan Draft Regional Policy Statement, above n 80, see p 50. 
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the CWMS.144 But how realistic is it to expect that such aspirations will be converted into practice 
using a social contract? That requires the social contract to form a clear boundary of responsibility 
for the implementation of other regarding action. A clear statutory basis for is required for 
interpreting and enforcing such obligations. 
 
                                                          
144  Environment Canterbury Act 2010, Sch 1. 
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Chapter 3 
The social contract as a legal tool for improved water management 
The potential uncertainty associated with a social contract may be overcome by strategic planning 
that engages with the relevant networks and clearly incorporates the issues of significance as the 
basis for setting obligations in a contract for a defined period. This allows both parties to the 
contract-the regional council (on behalf of society) and an entitlement holder-to be clear about 
where the boundary of responsibility lies and what is expected for making a contribution to 
sustainable management of water within a particular zone and region.145 This appears to be the 
process being followed under the CWMS. Whether this can overcome the obstacles to using a social 
contract as a clear boundary of responsibility remains to be seen as the regional and local planning 
processes unfold. 
 
A legal framework can provide guiding principles for water management, such as equitable and 
reasonable use, and an obligation not to harm neighbours.146 I contend that such principles, reliant 
on notions of ‘reasonable’ and ‘harm between neighbours’ in the context of a market to maximise 
private interests, are only likely to oblige a minimum level of accountability.147 
 
Stewardship requires legal principles to encourage norms, rights and obligations that emphasise 
other regarding action as an element for ongoing legal access to resource entitlements. I suggest this 
may be achieved if virtue ethics can be used to provide a focus for establishing water stewardship as 
part of moral character, i.e. a habit of action and character trait.148 For example, specific virtues such 
as fair and judicious usage, honesty and a concern for water systems might provide suitable 
principles of stewardship that increase this other regarding element of law.149 
 
I return now to the principal question: what version of improved water management is the ECan Act 
likely to deliver? In answering this I will identify the likely effectiveness of a social contract for 
providing norms of conservation behaviour, legitimacy and trust that curb exploitation of water 
entitlements and reflect a virtuous conception of wellbeing. These four components combine to 
determine if a social contract can effectively specify practical obligations of access and use for 
stewardship of water. That is to chart a path from a virtuous conception of wellbeing to water access 
entitlements, via useful laws.150 
 
The rights and responsibilities of a water entitlement, rely on defining what legal obligations would 
be useful for NZ society.151The social contract as an effective boundary of responsibility for water 
management becomes subject to its usefulness as a way to achieve society’s expectations of water 
entitlement holders as resource stewards. Such expectations are frequently expressed as other 
regarding actions in law and policy about sustainable natural resource management and 
environmental protection. This approach to defining responsibilities of water access presents the 
virtues of sustainability and resource stewardship as counter to a market-based approach. The 
market has legally detached property entitlements to water from the environmental values of the 
                                                          
145  Shepheard and Martin, above n 9. 
146  Postel, above n 64, see p 149. 
147  Shepheard and Martin, above n 18; Shepheard and Martin, above n 66. 
148  Hursthouse, above n 69.  
149  Walsh and Shepheard, above n 70. 
150  Rosalind Hursthouse, 'Hume on Justice' in Charles R Pigden (ed), Hume on Motivation and Virtue, Philosophers in 
Depth (Palgrave MacMillan, 2009) pp 274-275. 
151  Ibid. 
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land despite the physical and ecological connections between the two.152The purpose of introducing 
countervailing values is to develop and enhance a model of entitlement that is based on both 
responsibility and right, rather than right alone. This model incorporates virtue as a necessary part of 
a just and efficient legal order,153 into water law so that the action of resource managers may be 
directed by motivation other than self-interest. This reinforces the function of law as a body of rules 
and norms at the core of an access entitlement.154 
 
I will now examine the legal and policy framework for improving water management in Canterbury 
relative to each component of the boundary of responsibility (norms, entitlements, legitimacy, and 
trust). In doing so I will identify which version of improved the social contract for water access and 
use is likely to favour: the minimal accountability of private interest or other regarding actions of 
resource stewardship. This will help evaluate the effectiveness of the social contract as a boundary 
of responsibility to define water stewardship obligations. 
3.1 Norms of behaviour 
Norms represent social expectations upon water entitlement holders, balancing self-interest with 
community wellbeing.155They have a critical role in helping resolve disputes when attempts to 
achieve a balance are brought to an impasse.156 To be effective, this requires a correlation between 
norms and operating rules so that entitlement holders can be held accountable for performance 
against the norms. 
 
Norms based on stewardship emphasise the obligation to take care.157 This resonates in political and 
legal declarations about sustainability and resource stewardship.158 For example, sustainable 
management in the RMA is value laden with a multitude of ethical indicators.159 These need to be 
interpreted with guiding principles and community norms about stewardship that are often 
incompatible with principles and norms about the freedoms of private property.160 Only the state 
has the capacity to designate the principles and rules for broader governance arrangements.161 But 
to be effective these must be developed out of local and regional decision making processes.162 
There are several sources for developing norms of water stewardship in Canterbury. The CWMS has 
a regional emphasis that is intended to link with RMA policies and plans (see … above). The Land and 
Water Forum and Water NZ propose national principles intended to emphasise water stewardship. 
These will now be reviewed for their effectiveness in contributing to the development of norms that 
provide a distinction between right and wrong conduct, and values about what’s important for 
water stewardship in developing the social contract as a clear boundary of responsibility. 
 
The CWMS aims for present and future generations to gain the greatest benefits from water 
resources within an environmentally sustainable framework.163 The Canterbury Mayoral Forum 
expects that success in achieving this vision will involve:164 fairness, inclusive decision-making, extra 
                                                          
152  Fisher, above n 67; Godden, above n 50. 
153  Koller, above n 68. 
154  Godden, above n 50, see p 414. 
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judicial dispute resolution, audited self-management, environmental protection and restoration, 
healthy water quality, active cultural custodianship and management, improved recreational 
amenity, reliability of supply, increasing economic value of irrigation realised, economic value of 
water based tourism realised, renewable and efficient energy in irrigation infrastructure, rural 
community cohesion and viability improved, increased understanding and empathy across the rural 
and urban water use divide, an adaptable water management system for climate change. This is a 
complex range of expectations that reinforces the tension between private interests and 
stewardship concerns. 
 
The Mayoral Forum expectations draw on potentially competing norms and in practice may not be 
complimentary. For example, can we expect fairness from an extra-judicial decision-making process? 
Is audited self-management consistent with environmental protection? Does an increase in supply 
reliability and the economic value of irrigation conflict with cultural custodianship? It is likely to be 
difficult to find a common conception of right and wrong conduct and beliefs about what is 
important, that are consistent enough to define water stewardship norms. Particularly if such norms 
are to underpin operating rules that will be used to hold people to account. 
 
The Land and Water Forum position society’s stewardship concerns as the norms of water 
management decision-making.165 Their recommendation is to balance competing values using the 
basic issues of fairness, reasonableness, justice and morality.166 Such statements seem to be directed 
at other regarding actions, but further reading reveals proposals for water allocation based on: 
Efficiency of use, even-handedness between users and, consistency of practice.167Efficiency of use is 
ensuring the allocation is for a justifiable purpose and uses a reasonable quantity of water.168 This 
assessment comprises ‘beneficial use’ relative to amount taken, ‘optimal use’ for the environment 
and society-with allocation to the ‘highest value’-and temporal adjustment of use relative to 
allocation.169The market basis of this approach170 is anticipated to emphasise private rights.171 
 
Water NZ has identified norms for private use of water that generate resource management in the 
public good.172 An approach favoured by the Primary Sector Water Partnership as norms of ‘good 
practice’ for wellbeing.173 The Land and Water Forum and CWMS are supportive of good practice 
norms in meeting the social contract.174 However, the risk of this approach is that disputes between 
private interests and public good will be reduced to questions of reasonableness, as has occurred 
with fisheries in NZ.175 When this occurs, the standard is likely to favour common practice and 
freedom of private interest over increased care.176 
For the CWMS, Land and Water Forum or Water NZ proposals to be truly effective in overcoming 
competing norms, requires a basis in law to establish water access and use entitlements as a 
contribution to water stewardship, dependant on other regarding action. 
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3.2 Resource access entitlements 
Statutory changes to resource access entitlements represent a shift in property characteristics and 
rely on the courts to reinterpret and reconcile how right holders are affected (within the scope of 
upholding justice).177 Improved water management in Canterbury favours a social contract as a 
means to specify resource access entitlements.178 It is likely that this new form of access right will at 
some point be disputed to determine the extent that the contract represents a private property 
interest. This re-emphasises property as a relationship between entitlement holder and society with 
the key concern being whose rights are likely to prevail in the event of dispute.179 
 
Defining the boundary between private use rights and the public good obligations associated with 
access and use of water emphasises the legal tension,180 where a focus on the private rights of 
access is expected to emphasise minimal accountability over stewardship expectations.181For 
example, with water management in Canterbury, the giver is the regional council (on behalf of 
society) seeking resource stewardship and the receiver may be a dairy farmer, seeking certainty of 
entitlement and clarity of individual rights in the water resource. Such certainty is important for the 
commercial framework within which the farmer operates, as access to water is a valuable economic 
right that brings legitimate commercial expectations.182 These are important considerations for the 
version of improved water management likely to emerge from social contracts. 
 
Resource allocation is a fundamental but hotly contested issue for water governance.183 It may be 
affected by norms of behaviour, regulations and market-based approaches.184  A market for the 
allocation and trade of water stimulates private interests and the baggage of property reinforces 
those,185 heightening tension between private interest goals and public sustainability outcomes. A 
narrow preoccupation with personal property rights is at odds with the holistic policy of 
sustainability and sustainable management of resources in the RMA.186 But statutory signals within 
the act do not help to overcome this: One example is identifying that a permit to access resources is 
not property in the RMA, but then defining the nature of the consent using property law notions as 
if it were private property.187Use of the market to create a value and facilitate transfer of water 
entitlements is only likely to reinforce private interests.188 Thus a social contract for access to water 
might preside over a hardening of private interests in resource consent. 
 
Good practice, wellbeing and stewardship are important notions of performance that affect new 
models of resource access, where property rights are subject to adjustment in the interests of 
sustainability.189 They represent an elevated boundary of responsibility, with variable characteristics 
dependant on location in the landscape and type of farming system.  This variability is a problem if 
good practice is to become a legally enforceable normative standard for performance. 
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Such variation may be temporarily achieved in a contract, provided a landholder agrees. But that 
does not address the fundamental issue that an access entitlement comes with the freedom of a 
private interest protected by law with minimal accountability.190 For example, the nature of water 
rights under the RMA is to provide commercial certainty and safeguard the ongoing entitlement of 
an existing water right.191 This is a bias to ignore a social contract and sustainable management 
obligations as public goods beyond the level of responsibility that an ordinary holder of a private 
resource access entitlement should have to bear. Effective incorporation of stewardship into 
resource consents needs a permanent reassignment of property rights recognising that social and 
environmental wellbeing are integral parts of the access entitlement.192 This approach requires 
recognition in consents that access to resources arises out of civil society, with boundaries dictated 
by the priorities and concerns of modern society,193but without being subject to the constantly 
changing whims of social expectation.194 
 
Such a model founded on other regarding action might succeed in bringing legitimacy to a social 
contract by defining the water access entitlement (right) in terms of stewardship rather than private 
interest.  
3.3 Legitimacy 
Collaboration in water management planning anticipates legitimacy.195 This occurs when private use 
rights are socially accepted on the assurance that resource stewardship is delivered.196 Verifying 
performance is done using the rules, processes and norms that interact to form the social contract. 
This provides a useful connection between community stakeholders and the resource entitlement 
holder, legitimising activity by providing a focal point for cooperation that transcends self-interest.197 
This connection is a prerequisite to laws that genuinely support wellbeing,198 where law provides 
standards and decision-making processes for acting on sustainable natural resource management.199  
Over time, debate about uncertain and evolving social expectations may develop precise meaning 
for a social contract and associated obligations. But in the interim it seems unlikely to reduce 
uncertainty about responsibilities.200 
 
There remains a very likely risk that such a process will only legitimise ‘common’ rather than ‘good’ 
or ‘best’ resource management practice. This is due to the power of political interests within the 
collaborative process, where private interests are likely to be strongly advocated rather than public 
                                                          
190  Stallworthy, above n 5, see pp 71-73.  
191  Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Limited [2005] 2 NZLR 268, with a water allocation to be protected against 
other potential users of the resource (non derogation of right); Ken Palmer, 'An analysis of recent case law 
developments' in Derek Nolan (ed), Environmental Issues-insight and inspiration (New Zealand Law Society, 2005) ; 
Kemp v Dart River Safaries Ltd [2000] NZRMA 440; Jo Appleyard, 'Has the Resource Management Act Replaced the 
Property Law Act?' (New Zealand Law Society, 2007); Atkins, above n 168. 
192  Rodgers, above n 189, see p 250; A statutory duty of care has been promoted as the basis for a stewardship ethic in 
Australia, see Gardner, above n 56.  However, this is unlikely to offer an immediate solution, see Shepheard and 
Martin, above n 18. 
193  Rodgers, Ibid, see p 257. 
194  Shepheard and Martin, above n 9. 
195  Gunningham, above n 64; Sandra Postel and Brian Richter, Rivers for life: Managing water for people and nature 
(Island Press, 2003) p 169. 
196  Turnbull Group, above n 4, see appendix B.  
197  Judith R Blau, Social Contracts and Economic Markets (Plenum Press, 1993) p 18. 
198  Hursthouse, above n 150. 
199  James Woodhill and Niels G Roling, 'The second wing of the eagle: the human dimension in learning our way to more 
sustainable futures' in Niels G Roling and M Annemarie E Wagemakers (eds), Facilitating Sustainable Agriculture 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998) p 57. 
200  Shepheard and Martin, above n 9. 
 24 
good interests in relation to property entitlements.201 For Canterbury primary production interests 
will likely prevail over public good stewardship concerns.202 Thus what is favoured as legitimate is 
minimal accountability, upholding the freedom to manage an entitlement as a commodity on the 
market.  
3.4 Trust 
Trust has two roles in relation to an effective social contract. First is trust in the strategic 
management process underpinning a social contract; second is trust in the relationship between 
different interests within that process.  
 
Confidence in a community process for specifying credible access and use arrangements stems from 
the trust of all stakeholders (in the process and each other). But this is easily eroded when that 
process is held up by political decisions of government and/or overtaken by Ministerial 
intervention.203Trust in the face of central government intervention has been an issue for 
collaborative water management in Canterbury. The ECan Act and installation of commissioners with 
a clear mandate for improved water management occurred over the top of the established CWMS 
process and relationships.204 However, the ECan Act does place the CWMS framework as central to 
improved water management, which different stakeholders like the Water Rights Trust and 
Federated Farmers both support.205 
 
Trust is a factor for the primary sector as it seeks improved understanding and alignment with the 
community about its freshwater management expectations.206 This is strongly linked to reputation. 
Building trust revolves around sharing water between irrigation and other uses, but water sharing is 
also the most likely issue for breakdown of trust and harm to reputation.207 The two sources of 
debate are indicative of this general conflict. For example, the primary sector claims to have shaped 
NZ, to be central to ongoing economic performance of the nation and maintenance of quality of 
life.208 The sector promotes self-management as the best way to address decline in the natural 
capital base for continued wellbeing and economic prosperity.209 Acknowledgement of declining 
natural capital is not enough for community interests, who claim that the best way forward is for full 
cooperation of the rural sector to work within environmental constraints and adapt so that 
economic imperatives will not prevail over environmental ones.210 
 
Whether a social contract can meet both community wellbeing expectations and the self-
management expectations of primary sector entitlement holders remains to be seen. I suggest it will 
be complicated to reconcile the private interests of self-management within the primary sector with 
public good outcomes. The use of private interest to support the public good of the nation is likely to 
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succeed politically in debate about resource allocation.211  Thus economically powerful primary 
sector interests are likely to prevail over others in the demand for water,212 posing a threat to the 
process of collaboration and a loss of trust in the value of a social contract. 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusions about the effectiveness of a social contract as a legal 
boundary of responsibility for improved water management 
There is strong support for norms of good practice to put a social contract into effect and meet 
wellbeing expectations for improved water management. The risk of this approach is that debate 
between private interests and public good over norms of practice will be reduced to questions of 
reasonableness, as has occurred with fisheries in NZ.213 When this occurs, the standard is likely to 
favour common practice and freedom of private interest over increased stewardship for the public 
good. 
 
A fundamental issue for improved public good water management is that an access entitlement 
comes with the freedom of a private interest protected by law with minimal accountability. For 
example, the nature of water rights under the RMA is to provide commercial certainty and safeguard 
the ongoing entitlement of an existing water right.214 This is a bias to ignore a social contract and 
sustainable management obligations as public goods beyond the level of responsibility that an 
ordinary holder of a private resource access entitlement should have to bear.  
 
Economically powerful primary industries interests supporting such freedoms of self-management 
are likely to prevail in a collaborative process.215 The effect of this will be to prioritise private benefit 
over resource stewardship in water management by reliance on reasonable practice, thus 
legitimising minimal standard of common practice. The use of private interest to support the 
wellbeing of the nation is likely to succeed politically in debate about resource allocation. Thus 
economically powerful primary sector interests are likely to prevail over others in the demand for 
water, posing a threat to environmental outcomes and a loss of trust in the value of a social 
contract. 
 
Legal processes will, by necessity, shape the management of water by a statutory social contract. If 
the balanced and holistic approach envisaged for a social contract is not clearly defined, then the 
law will look to make sense of the obligations in the face of ongoing conflict and confusion. The 
above analysis of a social contract as a legal boundary of responsibility suggests that, without a clear 
statutory basis for a higher standard of care in the access and use of water, collaborative processes 
and the legal framework are only likely to support a minimum level of accountability. The social 
contract has potential to specify improved water stewardship, but that requires obligations to be 
defined in virtuous terms, if laws are to be of any use in providing for water stewardship based on 
other regarding action rather than private interest. This is not to suggest that water entitlement 
holders should be subject to ever shifting social expectations, rather that a clear and enforceable 
statement of stewardship obligation is required in law so that entitlement holders can operate in 
knowledge of what the public good interest is in their resource management practice. A social 
contract is unlikely to provide such clarity without statutory reform to specify improved water 
management as stewardship rather than minimal accountability. Effective change needs a 
permanent reassignment of property rights to incorporate a stewardship ethic, recognising that 
social and environmental wellbeing is an integral part of an access entitlement. This will allow the 
social contract to be a useful legal tool in moving water management to an improved level that goes 
beyond the status quo. 
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The ECan Act is unlikely to improve water management by relying on a statutory social contract 
unless it can practically embed virtue into a legal framework for access and use and water. This 
would be founded on clear statutory stewardship principles to overcome the dominant institutional 
bias toward minimal accountability. Then, as suggested by this review, it is possible to provide a 
clear foundation for improved water management, including: A market that operates in clear 
knowledge of stewardship expectations; access rights with clear stewardship obligations; a boundary 
of responsibility to build consensus around virtue, rather than minimal accountability; and clear 
basis for legal enforcement within the checks and balances of the courts rather than behind the 
closed doors of administrators. 
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